“President Clinton and the Republican Congress, 1995-2000: Political and Policy Dimensions of Veto Politics in Divided Government”*

This article melds alternative theoretical perspectives on veto threats to explain Clinton’s influence over legislative outcomes in the 104th-106th Congresses (1995-2000). Formal models of executive-legislative relations — in particular the “coordination model” — yield an incomplete understanding of veto politics and executive-legislative conflict from 1995-2000. Explaining Clinton’s success through veto politics requires a recognition of the unique context of legislative conflict from 1995-96. Presidential-congressional relations in the 104th Congress turned on “blame-game ” politics that Clinton manipulated to his advantage. Clinton’s second term heralded a return to “normal politics ” during which the Republican majority’s response to his veto threats coincided better with the basic tenets of the coordination model. Quantitative analysis of Clinton’s public threats and secondary analysis of bill histories are brought to bear to test the theoretical framework. 1 President William Jefferson Clinton did not set out to master Congress by the explicit or implicit use of the veto power. He cast not a single veto in the 103rd Congress (1993-94)